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Abstract 
 
The focus in some literatures towards the end of the 20th century on the crisis of 
governability and on challenges to governance in the western world has given way in 
the early part of the 21st century to a focus on broader social and political uncertainty 
in the face of a world now dominated by ongoing threats of major terrorist activity. 
These developments, together with evidence of declining trust and social capital, have 
placed considerable pressure on a range of major social and political institutions. This 
paper uses survey research data to investigate public confidence in a number of 
prominent organisations and institutions in Australia and how this confidence is 
changing. The paper considers not only the level of public confidence, but also the 
dimensionality of such attitudes and the socio-political factors that shape them. The 
paper concludes with a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of 
the findings. 
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Introduction 
 
In the academic literature, the notion of strains on democratic political regimes has 
waxed and waned at different times over the course of the post-war period. In the 
1960s and 1970s concerns arose about a ‘crisis of governability’ (Rose 1980), but 
these declined somewhat during the 1980s. In the early 21st century, however, a 
growing consensus is emerging in the literature that regardless of ‘crisis’ theories per 
se, there is an important ongoing issue of how the expectations and beliefs of mass 
publics support or undermine good government.  
 Such concerns are in turn linked to notions of social capital and civic trust 
and the connections these may have with the quality of democratic government 
(Putnam 1993; 2000). Amid debates about whether trust in government and 
confidence in political, social and economic institutions is declining and whether 
electorates are becoming more demanding, less satisfied and more critical of 
governmental performance, there is increasing acceptance that, irrespective of the 
direction in which they might be trending, such orientations on the part of the public, 
combined with the economic, social and political realities facing modern political 
regimes represent significant challenges to governance (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; 
Norris 1999; Warren 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  
 These concerns have been highlighted all the more by the escalation of 
terrorism and the rise in numbers of refugees and people seeking asylum in countries 
like Australia in the early part of the 21st century. These events have served to 
broaden the focus of challenges facing governments and societies to cover a wide 
range of social, economic and political institutions. As evidence that the widely 
discussed and highly valued notion of social capital – the social cement that binds 
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communities – is being undermined, many authors have pointed to an ongoing 
decline in political and social trust (Nye, Zelikow and King 1997; Putnam 2000; 
Burchell and Leigh 2002).  
 This paper focuses on the related notion of confidence (Lipset and Schneider 
1983). If trust is about perceptions of the integrity of persons, confidence is more 
about evaluations of the effectiveness of organisations and institutions in performing 
their designated roles. The strains on major social, economic and political 
institutions in the current climate suggest that it may be becoming increasingly 
difficult for such institutions to maintain public confidence and this is one of the key 
questions this paper sets out to address through an examination of empirical data. In 
addition it investigates both the dimensionality and the socio-political bases of 
confidence in public institutions. 
 
Levels of Confidence 
We begin the empirical analysis with an examination of the level of public confidence 
in a range of different social, economic and political institutions in contemporary 
Australia, using data from the 2001 Australian Election Study (AES), a national postal 
survey of voters conducted just after the 2001 federal election (Bean, Gow and 
McAllister 2002). The paper then proceeds to compare these current levels of 
confidence with equivalent readings spanning back to the early 1980s. The 2001 AES 
asked respondents about their level of confidence in 14 different institutions, with the 
question: ‘How much confidence do you have in the following organisations?’ Four 
answer categories were provided, namely: ‘a great deal of confidence’, ‘quite a lot of 
confidence’, ‘not very much confidence’ and ‘none at all’. The list of organisations, in 
the order presented in the survey questionnaire, is shown in Table 1.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 The first observation that Table 1 suggests is that at the beginning of the 21st 
century the level of citizen confidence in Australian public institutions appears for the 
most part not to be terribly high. If we divide the responses in Table 1 into those that 
are essentially positive (that is, those that express a great deal of confidence and quite 
a lot of confidence) and those that are essentially negative (not very much confidence 
and none at all), then of the 14 institutions, only five are viewed positively on balance 
– in other words only five have more than 50% of respondents giving one or other of 
the positive responses: the armed forces, the police, the federal government in 
Canberra, universities and the Australian political system.  
Easily the institution that inspires the most confidence is the armed forces, 
with 26% of the AES sample expressing a great deal of confidence and a further 58% 
saying they have quite a lot of confidence in the military, giving a total of 84% with a 
positive response. The next most highly rated institution is universities, in which 11% 
and 62% of respondents express a great deal and quite a lot of confidence, 
respectively, for a total positive rating of 73%. The only other institution on the list 
that could be considered to have a high confidence rating is the police, in whom 68% 
express confidence (13% a great deal and 55% quite a lot). 
At the other end of the confidence scale, the press languishes at the bottom, 
with only 1% of the sample prepared to say that they have a great deal of confidence 
in that institution and a further 17% expressing quite a lot of confidence. In other 
words, less than one in five respondents show some level of confidence in the press. 
Banks and financial institutions engender only a little more public confidence, with a 
total of 23% showing some confidence in these institutions, while 26% of respondents 
express confidence in trade unions and 27% in television. Political institutions tend to 
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come in the middle of the range of responses, between the high scoring and low 
scoring institutions. Political parties and the public service rate lowish, with about a 
third of the sample expressing confidence, while the federal government, the 
parliament and the Australian political system in general have the confidence of about 
half of the Australian electorate. 
 
Changes in Confidence 
Equivalent questions were asked about a number of the same institutions in the 
Australian versions of the World Values Survey, conducted in 1983 and 1995 
(Inglehart et al. 2000). Reflecting on those two sets of data, Papadakis (1999: 75) 
reported on the ‘sharp decline in confidence in governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations between 1983 and 1995’. The data in Table 2 confirm this assessment. 
Of the eight institutions in which confidence was measured in both 1983 and 1995, 
five of them (the legal system, the press, the federal government, the public service 
and major companies) recorded falls in confidence of proportions that fit the ‘sharp 
decline’ description, while confidence in the police declined slightly and trade unions 
(at a low level) and the armed forces (at a much higher level) remained in much the 
same place in terms of public confidence. None of the eight institutions showed any 
significant rise between 1983 and 1995.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Given the traumas that the world has experienced in recent times it would not 
be too surprising to find that confidence had slipped even further between 1995 and 
2001. On the contrary, however, Table 2 suggests that for the most part this is not the 
case. Eleven of the same institutions were included in both 1995 and 2001. Of these, 
levels of confidence declined in only two, the police and major Australian companies. 
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Five others – the legal system, the press, television, trade unions and the public 
service – retained a fairly similar level of confidence and four – the armed forces, the 
federal government, political parties and the federal parliament – recorded increased 
levels of confidence.  
It should be noted that some authors have pointed to problems with the 
accuracy of certain components of the 1995 World Values Survey data for Australia 
(Tranter and Western 2003), although there is no obvious reason to doubt the veracity 
of the confidence data from the survey. For the political items in particular, timing of 
the 1995 and 2001 surveys could be a factor to consider when interpreting changes 
between the two, since the 2001 survey was conducted immediately after a federal 
election while the 1995 survey was conducted mid-term. Thus the higher levels of 
confidence recorded in the three political institutions in 2001 could partly be a 
reflection of their higher salience in the wake of a federal election campaign. It is also 
interesting to note how the confidence rating for the federal government went down 
between 1983 and 1995 and then up again in 2001. This may reflect the cyclical 
nature of the related concept of trust in government, with it having been observed 
elsewhere, for instance, that trust declined in the early 1990s towards the end of the 
long term of Labor government and rose again after the government changed in 1996 
(Bean 2001).  
Notwithstanding the possibility of particular explanations for some of the 
changes in confidence levels, the picture of public confidence in 2001, compared to 
the 1980s and 1990s, is not as bleak as some may have assumed it might be. Of 
course, some institutions, like the press, television and trade unions, maintained 
steady levels of confidence from a rather low base. Probably the most noteworthy rise 
in confidence was for the armed forces, which must surely be a reflection of the 
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terrorist age in which we now live. Perhaps strangely, though, while confidence rose 
in the defence forces, the civil arm of the security connection, the police, suffered a 
decline in confidence. It is not clear from the data whether this might reflect a feeling 
of a lack the ability of the police to ensure personal safety or completely different 
factors that might feed into how confident people feel in the police.  
Though confidence in the public service fell slightly in 2001, on top of a 
substantial decline in 1995, the only institution under scrutiny to suffer a marked 
decline in confidence at both time points was major Australian companies. When we 
put this trend together with the very low reading in 2001 for banks and financial 
institutions, this would appear to constitute evidence that ordinary citizens feel 
increasingly isolated from big business. Similarly it may reflect the economic 
insecurity of the individual that pervades modern life and for which major 
corporations and financial institutions may be held responsible.  
Overall, then, when we compare the data from 1983, 1995 and 2001 we find a 
very mixed picture of changes in confidence in public institutions. Most interestingly, 
there is no sense from these data that public confidence in institutions is inexorably 
declining across the board, but neither is there any strong indication of an increase. 
Rather, particular institutions show certain trends and not all of these are entirely 
consistent with each other. 
 
Dimensions of Confidence 
The next step is to exam the data further for signs of consistency through factor 
analysis. In this case we are looking for evidence of dimensionality in the data, in 
other words, whether there tends to be a consistent pattern of responses to certain 
items that would identify them as a group apart from the others. Preliminary analyses 
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showed that many of the confidence items did not group in this way, but eight of the 
items did load, on three distinct dimensions, as reported in Table 3. The entries in the 
table are rotated factor loadings derived from a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The three dimensions Table 3 identifies constitute a politics grouping, a media 
grouping and a security grouping. The first factor in the table reveals strong loadings 
for the items measuring confidence in the four institutions of politics, the government, 
political parties, parliament and the political system. No other item has a loading of 
any significant size on this factor. Thus we have a clear factor representing confidence 
in institutions of politics. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of .89 shows 
this to be a highly reliable four-item scale.  
The second factor has strong loadings on the two items depicting confidence 
in the media – the press and television. This dimension also has a high reliability 
(.79). The third factor is also quite distinct and shows the items measuring confidence 
in the armed forces and the police clustering together on a factor that can be labelled 
confidence in institutions of security. The factor loadings, however, are not as strong 
on this factor and the reliability (.47) is in fact quite low. While this is clearly not as 
reliable a scale as the other two dimensions, it is, however, worth keeping it in the 
analysis, given the interest in institutions of security in the current world context and 
the high level of confidence expressed in the police and the armed forces. We will, 
however, need to keep the scale’s less solid statistical properties in mind in the 
analysis that follows. 
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Determinants of Confidence 
Having identified a number of dimensions of confidence we are now in a position to 
explore the question of which socio-political factors may underpin these public 
attitudes. To do this we construct three simple additive scales combining, in turn, the 
four politics items, the two media items and the two security items. We then conduct a 
multiple regression analysis on each dimension of confidence, with ten independent 
variables in the model – gender, age, education, occupational grade, trade union 
membership, subjective social class, religious denomination, church attendance, 
region of residence and political party identification. The results are shown in Table 4.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The entries in Table 4 are standardised partial regression coefficients (betas) 
from a multiple regression analysis of each confidence dimension with the ten 
independent variables. The total variance explained by each equation (R2) is shown in 
the bottom line of the table. The first column of figures shows the results for the 
analysis of the scale measuring confidence in political institutions. The total variance 
explained in this equation is 18%, which is a moderate level of explanation in this 
kind of analysis. Only five of the ten independent variables, however, have significant 
effects on citizen confidence in institutions of politics. Neither gender, nor education, 
nor union membership, nor religious denomination, nor region of residence have any 
measurable impact on confidence in political institutions (and, indeed, the first three 
of these variables have no impact on any of the three confidence dimensions).  
On the other hand age, occupational grade, subjective class, church attendance 
and, in particular, political party identification do have significant effects. Though the 
size of the effect is modest, age influences confidence in political institutions such 
that older citizens are more inclined to display confidence than the young. In addition, 
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those in white collar occupations and, separately, those who see themselves as middle 
class express more confidence than blue collar and working class respondents 
respectively. More frequent church attendance also leads to greater confidence.  
Easily the strongest and most interesting effects on confidence in institutions 
of politics comes from party identification. Political confidence is divided along 
partisan lines. Party identification is measured by a set of dummy variables for each 
partisan grouping, with Liberal-National identification being the omitted reference 
category. The data show that Labor Party identifiers display substantially less 
confidence in political institutions than those who identify with the Liberal or 
National parties. To a somewhat lesser extent, those who identify with minor parties 
such as the Democrats, the Greens and One Nation, also express less political 
confidence than coalition supporters, as do those with no political affiliation at all. In 
this sense, political confidence is like the related concept of political trust, in that 
supporters of the party in government tend to be much more positive about the merits 
of the political regime than do other electors (Bean 2001).  
Confidence in institutions of the media presents quite a different picture. The 
low level of confidence displayed in these institutions appears to pertain quite 
uniformly across different socio-demographic groups. The only exceptions lie in the 
modest effects for occupation (blue collar workers have more confidence in the media 
than white collar workers), religious denomination (those who hold no religion 
display less confidence than those in Protestant denominations, the reference 
category) and region of residence (people who live in cities and towns are more 
confident about media institutions than those who live in rural areas). But there are no 
gender, age, education or political differences in levels of confidence in the media, 
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suggesting a fairly widespread consensus among the Australia public on the merits of 
the media, or the lack thereof.  
The analysis of confidence in institutions of security produces results that 
come some way in between the other two dimensions. As with confidence in political 
institutions, older people display more confidence than the young in institutions of 
security. Although the relationships are much more modest, there is also a similar 
partisan thread to confidence in security institutions. Government supporters are 
rather more inclined to express confidence in the institutions of security than 
supporters of other parties, which is consistent with the stances taken by the different 
political parties on the key security issues of terrorism and border protection. Similar 
to confidence in the media, however, respondents with no religion are less likely to 
show confidence in the institutions of security than are those in the Protestant 
reference category. And as for the media institutions, the level of variance explained 
overall by the equation for institutions of security is low. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the preliminary nature of the analysis in this paper, the findings point to a 
number of theoretical and practical implications. One of these is that, despite the 
arguments of theorists who point to the strains on public institutions in the 
contemporary world and the expectation this may bring of a decline in public 
confidence, and in spite of a fairly low level of confidence registered in many 
institutions, there is no clear tendency for institutions to be losing public confidence 
en masse. For instance, while confidence in major economic institutions does appear 
to have declined over the last two decades, confidence in the military appears to have 
increased in recent years. Confidence in political institutions, on the other hand, has 
 12
ebbed and flowed and confidence in some other institutions has remained relatively 
static. 
Overall, public confidence in the institutions forming the focus of the analysis 
is not divided strongly along socio-demographic lines. For example, confidence in 
public institutions does not appear to be a gender issue and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, nor is it divided along educational lines. To some extent there is, 
however, an age effect, at least for the institutions of politics and security. The 
findings for the age variable may represent a life-cycle or a generational effect. To the 
extent that the results for age represent a generational effect, the implication is that as 
new cohorts enter the electorate with lower levels of confidence, the strain on public 
institutions may increase. On the other hand, the evidence that confidence in political 
institutions, and to some extent institutions of security, has a party political basis 
suggests that patterns of confidence could be subject to substantial change with 
changes of government and changes of political agendas.  
In this sense, public confidence may move in waves that ebb and flow, but 
there is little evidence of – and perhaps less reason to expect than some may have 
assumed – an inexorable downward trend. This is not to say that major public 
institutions are not under strain. But it does indicate that the patterns of confidence in 
such institutions are perhaps more complex than arguments which link them to, for 
example, an ongoing decline in social capital. Indeed, far from a lack of confidence 
being exclusively a recent phenomenon, it must be said that many institutions have 
been struggling to maintain public confidence for many years. 
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Table 1: Confidence in Institutions, 2001 (percentages) 
 
 A great deal 
of 
confidence 
Quite a lot 
of 
confidence 
Not very much 
confidence 
None at 
all 
The armed forces 26 58 14 1 
The legal system 5 31 51 13 
The press 1 17 56 25 
Television 2 24 56 17 
Trade unions 3 24 49 25 
The police 13 55 27 5 
The federal government in 
Canberra 
6 45 38 11 
Australian political parties 2 31 55 12 
The federal parliament 5 44 41 9 
The public service 3 32 51 14 
Major Australian companies 3 43 44 9 
Banks and financial institutions 2 21 45 31 
Universities 11 62 22 5 
The Australian political system 8 46 36 10 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n = 2010). 
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Table 2: Confidence in Institutions, 1983, 1995 and 2001 
 
 Per cent with a great deal or quite a lot of 
confidence 
 
1983 1995 2001 
The armed forces 67 68 84 
The legal system 61 35 36 
The press 29 16 19 
Television - 25 27 
Trade unions 24 26 26 
The police 80 76 68 
The federal government in Canberra 55 26 51 
Australian political parties - 16 33 
The federal parliament - 31 49 
The public service 47 38 35 
Major Australian companies 79 59 46 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 1983 Australian data (n = 1200), 1995 Australian data (n = 2048); 
Australian Election Study, 2001 (n = 2010). 
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Table 3: Principal Components Analysis of Confidence Dimensions 
 
 Politics Media Security 
The federal government in Canberra .86 .10 .20 
Australian political parties .83 .21 .11  
The federal parliament .91 .10 .15 
The Australian political system .80 .05 .13 
The press .17 .89 .06 
Television .10 .90 .12 
The armed forces .08 .04 .86 
The police .27 .13 .70 
 
 
Reliability (alpha) .89 .79 .47 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n = 2010). 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of Socio-Political Correlates of Confidence  
in Institutions (standardised regression coefficients) 
 
Confidence in Institutions of:  
Politics Media Security 
Gender (male) -.00 -.04 .03 
Age (years) .06* -.02 .06* 
University degree .04 .01 -.04 
White collar occupation .08** -.06* .01 
Trade union member .03 .01 -.01 
Subjective middle class .12** .02 .04 
Religion (ref: Protestant) 
 Catholic 
 Other religion 
 No religion 
 
 
-.00 
.01 
.00 
 
-.04 
-.01 
-.08** 
 
-.04 
-.03 
-.10** 
Church attendance .07* -.00 -.01 
Urban residence .02 .08** .01 
Party identification (ref: Lib.-Nat.) 
 Labor 
 Minor party 
 No party id. 
 
 
-.30** 
-.23** 
-.23** 
 
.05 
-.05 
-.02 
 
-.06* 
-.10** 
-.10** 
R2 .18 .02 .04 
 
 
* p < .05 ;  ** p < .01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n = 2010). 
 
 
